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Contracts Written in Stone:
An Examination of
United States v. Winstar Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Winstar Corp.' sent a resounding message to Washington: The govern-
ment has to make good on its contracts.2 At the core of the Winstar
case were government contracts created in the 1980s under which sol-
vent thrifts3 agreed to acquire failed thrifts in exchange for favorable
accounting treatment.4 Without the contracts, the government, as the
thrifts' federal deposit insurer, would bear the cost of operating or
liquidating the failed thrifts.5 In 1989, Congress enacted legislation elim-
inating the favorable accounting treatment, rendering most of the sol-
vent acquiring thrifts insolvent.6 The government denied any further
responsibility, leaving the acquiring thrifts with the cost of continuing
operations or, in most cases, liquidation.7 The United States Supreme
1. 116 S. ct. 2432 (1996).
2. See id. at 2472.
3. The thrift industry consists of various types of financial institutions, including
savings and loan associations (S&Ls), savings banks, and credit unions. See 1 BAXTER
DUNAWAY ET AL., FIRREA: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.01, at 3-3 n.2 (1994). Traditionally,
regulations prohibited thrifts from offering the full range of services offered by banks,
such as checking, savings, and trust accounts. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE REGULA-
TION OF BANKING 41 (1992). However, government deregulation of the thrift industry
in the 1980s loosened many of the traditional restraints on thrift services. See id. For
the purposes of this Note, the terms "thrift" and "savings and loan" will be used
interchangeably because the Winstar decision only considers thrifts in their savings
and loan capacity. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2440.
4. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2445.
5. See Michael S. Heifer & William R. Richardson, Jr., Goodwill and Government
Promises, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 117, 122 (1990).
6. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2446; see also Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified
in part at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994)); William K Black, Ending Our Forebearers'
Forbearances: FIRREA and Supervisory Goodwill, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 102, 107
(1990) (stating that more than 500 thrifts failed to meet capital reserve requirements
after Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA)).
7. See Heifer & Richardson, supra note 5, at 122. Liquidation involves gathering
Court rejected the government's arguments for leaving the acquiring
thrifts with the costs of the bailout,8 and echoed its century-old pro-
nouncement in the Sinking Fund Cases that "'[tihe United States are as
much bound by their contracts as are individuals."'9 This came as good
news to most thrifts,'0 but for others the victory was bittersweet."
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The government stands in a unique position as a contractor because
it has the power to legislatively alter its contractual obligations;2 ac-
cordingly, there is a danger that the government will abuse this power
and avoid its contracts under the aegis of its sovereign power and du-
ties to the public welfare. Historically, in an effort to level the playing
field between the government and private contracting parties, the judi-
ciary has taken steps to prevent the government's abuse of power. For
example, in Lynch v. United States, " the government issued insurance
policies during World War I which provided for annual renewals at the
option of the insured.'4 In response to net losses on the policies in ex-
cess of $4.1 billion," the government passed legislation nullifying the
annual renewal options.'6 In an opinion written by Justice Brandeis,
the Court held that the government could not avoid its obligations un-
the thrift's assets, converting the assets into cash, and using the assets to pay off the
thrift's debts. See 3 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 6, § 15, at 87-88 (1996).
8. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2471-72.
9. See id. (quoting the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1878)).
10. Stephen J. Trafton, chairman and chief executive officer of Respondent Glen-
dale Federal stated, "Today's decision . . . reaffirms the American principle that the
government, like any private citizen, cannot walk away from its contracts with impu-
nity." David G. Savage, High Court Says U.S. Reneged on S&Ls, Must Pay, L.A.
TImEs, July 2, 1996, at A23. Glendale Federal's attorney, Jerry Stouck, stated that the
Winstar decision "means the government has to honor its obligations when it makes
a contract. It can't change the rules after it makes a deal." Id.
11. William Hussey, former director of the now defunct Florida League of Financial
Institutions stated, "All this means is that we were right, but it's too little, too late
for a lot of good thrifts that probably would have survived." Government Owes S&Ls:
Thrfts That Survived the Shutdown Could Use the Money for. Acquisitions, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 2, 1996, at B1, available in 1996 WL 2615385 [hereinafter Shutdown].
12. See generally Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477
U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (stating that all contracts are subject to subsequent legislation
unless sovereign power is surrendered in unmistakable terms); see also infra notes
32-44 and accompanying text (discussing Bowen).
13. 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
14. See id. at 574.
15. See id. at 576 n.2.
16. See id. at 575.
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der the insurance policies.1 7 After determining that the insurance poli-
cies were enforceable contracts,' the Court reasoned that "[w]hen the
United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein
are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between pri-
vate individuals." 9 In spite of the government's losses and the in-
creased impact of such losses due to the Depression, "the due process
clause prohibits the United States from annulling [its contracts] un-
less.., the action taken falls within the federal police power or some
other paramount power." ' ° While Congress has the power to reduce
excessive spending, it cannot exercise this power if doing so requires
breaching government contracts."'
To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen government expenditure, would be
not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation. "The United States are as
much bound by their contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their obliga-
tions, it is as much repudiation with all the wrong and reproach that term implies,
as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a citizen."'
In Perry v. United States,' the government issued bonds containing
clauses that the principal and interest must be repaid in United States
gold coin.' In 1933, Congress passed legislation abrogating these so-
17. See id. at 579.
18. See id. at 576.
19. Id. at 579; see Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1878); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) ("'The United States does business on
business terms.'") (quoting United States v. National Exch. Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534
(1926)); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1877) (stating that when the Unit-
ed States contracts with its citizens, the government is bound by the same laws that
govern citizens); Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (explaining that
when the United States enters contracts in commerce, it submits itself to the laws
governing citizens).
20. See Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579. See, e.g., Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow
Co., 279 U.S. 253, 262 (1929) (holding that government price-fixing of coal during
World War I did not violate the coal owners' due process rights).
21. See Lynch, 292 U.S. at 580; see also Morgan Guar. Trust v. Republic of Palau,
680 F. Supp. 99, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that the legislation at issue did not ad-
vance any paramount government power and was intended merely "to prevent United
States dollars from paying a bad debt" which was not a "sufficient cause to abrogate
the contract").
22. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 580 (quoting Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 719).
23. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
24. See id. at 347. In a companion case to Perry, Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), the Court dealt with the same "gold clause" legislation as
it applied to contracts between private parties. See Norman, 294 U.S. at 305.
called "gold clauses."' The Court held that the issuance of bonds cre-
ates a government obligation to repay the bondholder pursuant to the
express terms of the bond. 6 Although the government unquestionably
holds the power to regulate money values, Congress cannot use that
power "to invalidate the terms of the obligations which the Government
has theretofore issued in the exercise of the power to borrow money on
the credit of the United States."" The Court rejected the government's
claim that the government "is free to ... alter the terms of its obligations
in case a later Congress finds their fulfillment inconvenient."' In bor-
rowing money through the issuance of bonds, Congress has authority to
pledge the credit of the United States assuring repayment.' "To say that
the Congress may withdraw or ignore that pledge, is to assume that the
Constitution contemplates a vain promise, a pledge having no other sanc-
tion than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor." 3 The Court re-
fused to find that the gold clauses restrained the government's exercise
of sovereign power, stating that Congress has the power to create obliga-
tions on the part of the government, but not the power to alter or de-
stroy the obligations it creates.3'
The issues raised in Lynch and Perry were explored further in Bowen
v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment.' In Bowen,
Congress amended the Social Security Act of 1 93 5 3 to prevent states
and public agencies, which had previously participated in the Social Se-
25. Perry, 294 U.S. at 347. The legislation was designed to stabilize the United
States' banking industry and currency by preventing people from stockpiling gold.
Norman, 294 U.S. at 295-97.
26. See Perry, 294 U.S. at 348.
27. See id. at 350. By contrast, the Norman Court held that contracts between pri-
vate parties were not shielded from legislative change. Norman, 294 U.S. at 305. The
Court reasoned that if such a shield were permitted the government's power to regu-
late interstate commerce would be forfeited to private individuals. See id. at 310.
28. Perry, 294 U.S. at 350.
29. See id. at 351.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 353. Taken together, Norman and Perry crafted the "critical distinc-
tion between legislation affecting contracts between private parties and the same
legislation as applied to the government's own contracts." See Heifer and Richardson,
supra note 5, at 119. As to the former, legislation had the effect of interdiction; as
to the latter, the same legislation had the effect of repudiation. See id.; cf. United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) ("[C]omplete deference to a
legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the
State's self-interest is at stake."); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412-13 & n.14 (1983) (stating that a higher level of review
applies under the Contract Clause when the government alters its own contractual
obligations).
32. 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
33. 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1994)).
[Vol. 25: 567, 1998] Contracts Written in Stone
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
curity System voluntarily, from withdrawing their employees from the
system.' Before the amendment, states were permitted to withdraw
from the system upon two years notice to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.' Several public agencies of California and an organiza-
tion called Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment chal-
lenged the amendment on constitutional grounds.36 These parties
claimed the amendment was a taking of their "contractual right to with-
draw" without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.3 7
In Bowen, the Court upheld the amendment,' stating that all contracts,
even when the government itself is a party, are subject to subsequent
government, legislation.' Justice Powell, writing for the Court, cited
Lynch and Perry as cases that held the government can "enter into con-
tracts that confer vested rights."" Justice Powell clarified, however, that
the government right to exercise its sovereign power is not waived un-
less such waiver is expressly stated in unmistakable terms in the con-
tract." The Court emphasized that Congress expressly reserved the right
to amend the Social Security Act42 and that the agreements with the
states did not confer any rights other than those provided by the Act
itself." Further, because the states failed to provide separate consider-
ation under the agreements, no enforceable property rights were created
in the so-called right to withdraw."
34. See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 48-51.
35. See id. at 45.
36. See id. at 49.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 56.
39. See id. at 52 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147
(1982)).
40. See id.
41. See id. (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148); see also Jefferson Branch Bank v.
Skelley, 66 U.S. 436, 446 (1861) (stating that no power of sovereignty will be deemed
"surrendered unless such surrender has been expressed in terms too .plain to be mis-
taken"). This legal principle has come to be known as the unmistakability doctrine.
See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2454-55 (1996).
42. The Act contained an express reservation of Congress's right "to alter, amend,
or repeal any provision" of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994); Bowen, 477 U.S. at
44 n.2, 51-52.
43. See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 54.
44. See id. At least one commentator has pointed out that because there was "no
bargained-for consideration" in Bowen, there was no contract for the government to
breach. See Heifer & Richardson, supra note 5, at 120.
Finally, in United States v. Cherokee Nation,45 an Indian tribe that
acquired property rights in a riverbed through a government treaty
brought suit for damages after the government made navigational im-
provements to the river.46 The tribe based its claim on the assumption
that the treaty conveyed the government's navigational easement.47 Ap-
plying the unmistakability doctrine from Bowen, the Court held that the
navigational easement was not conveyed to the tribe because the treaty
was silent on the matter and the silence was not unmistakable.48
HI. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The modem thrift industry developed in the 1930s in response to the
failure of more than 1700 thrifts during the Great Depression.49 In an
attempt to stabilize thrifts and prevent future collapse, Congress took
steps to increase regulation of the thrift industry.' Congress created the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board) for the purpose of funding
thrifts for home loans and to prevent home foreclosures."' Additionally,
the legislature authorized the Bank Board to charter and regulate savings
and loan associations." Congress also created the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which was responsible for insuring
and regulating all federally insured thrifts.' Under this newly regulated
system, the thrift industry prospered' and regained public confi-
dence.'
However, the high inflation and interest rates of the late 1970s and
early 1980s wreaked havoc on the thrift industry.' Pursuant to the rules
45. 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
46. See id. at 702.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 707 (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 52).
49. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2440 (1996); see also H.R.
REP. No. 101-54(1), at 292 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 88.
50. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2440; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-54(1), at 292, re-
printed in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 88.
51. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (cod-
ified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1994)).
52. See Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1994)).
53. See National Housing Act of 1931, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750(g) (1994)).
54. The thrift industry held three percent of the country's total financial assets in
1945. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), at 293, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 89. This
figure increased to 15% by 1985. See id.
55. In 1988, nearly one half of family mortgages originated with thrifts. See id. at
291, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 87.
56. See, e.g., Paul Getman, The Last Temptation of Thrifts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23,
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and regulations of the time, thrifts issued only long-term, fixed-rate mort-
gages, rather than adjustable-rate mortgages. 57 An increase in interest
rates forced thrifts to pay higher rates to their depositors.' The thrifts'
revenues could not keep pace with the costs of the deposits because the
thrifts' mortgage rates were fixed, but short-term deposits were adjust-:
able and rising."9 As a result, approximately 435 thrifts became insolvent
between 1981 and 1983.' In response, the government deregulated the
thrift industry.6' Initially, deregulation involved: (1) allowing thrifts to
invest in different markets, (2) a two percent reduction in the capital
reserves requirement,6 2 and (3) the adoption of new accounting tech-
niques that masked the declining financial condition of the thrift indus-
try.' Amidst this deregulation, failed thrifts began making insurance
claims to the FSLIC.' 4 The FSLIC lacked sufficient funds to liquidate all
the insolvent thrifts, and as a result, ended up insolvent itself.' To facil-
itate liquidation of the failed thrifts in spite of the FSLIC's insolvency, the
Bank Board encouraged healthy thrifts to take over the failed thrifts.'
The government used the recognition of "supervisory goodwill"67 toward
1989, at A24; G. Christian Hill & Paulette Thomas, The Thrift Rescue-New Fiscal
Game: Big Thrift-Rescue Bill is Likely to Realign the Financial System, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 7, 1989, at Al; With the Thrifts, What Haven't the Regulators Tried?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1989, § 4, at 5.
57. See Black, supra note 6, at 103.
58. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2440 (1996).
59. See id.
60. See id. (citing General Accounting Office, THRIFr INDUSTRY: FORBEARANCE FOR
TROUBLED INSTITUTIONS 1982-1986 (May 1987)).
61. See id.
62. Capital reserves serve as a safety net to protect thrifts from future losses. See
id. In November 1980, the capital reserves requirement was decreased from 5% to 4%
of assets. See id. In January 1982, the capital reserves requirement was further re-
duced to 3% of assets. See id. at 2441.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. As of 1988, the FSLIC was over $50 billion in debt. See id.; see also H.R. REP.
No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 100.
In April 1987, the chairman of the Bank Board testified that the FSLIC's cash and
short-term securities holdings were less than $1 billion, yet the FSLIC was then in-
suring approximately $900 billion worth of deposits. See GAO Report to Proxmire on
Forbearance for Troubled Thrifts, AM. BANKER, May 29, 1987, at 4, available in 1987
WL 5524514.
66. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2442.
67. Supervisory goodwill is an intangible asset calculated by taking the excess of
the acquisition cost over the fair market value of the acquired thrift's assets. See id.
the capital reserve requirement to induce healthy thrifts to enter into so-
called "supervisory mergers."' Supervisory mergers appealed to the gov-
ernment because the government could not otherwise afford to bail out
failed and failing thrifts.69 Supervisory mergers appealed to healthy
acquiring thrifts because supervisory goodwill counted toward the capital
reserve requirement, which gave the acquiring thrifts' overall reserves an
inflated appearance attractive to potential investors.' Supervisory merg-
ers additionally appealed to acquiring thrifts because thrifts were permit-
ted to amortize supervisory goodwill over as much as forty years.7'
Respondents Glendale Federal Bank, FSB, Winstar Corporation, and
The Statesman Group, Inc. each entered into separate supervisory merg-
er transactions with the government.72 In 1981, Glendale Federal sub-
mitted a proposal to the Bank Board to acquire First Federal Savings and
Loan Association of Broward County (Broward).' At the time, Broward
was $734 million in debt and would cost the FSLIC approximately $1.8
billion to liquidate.7 4 The Bank Board approved Glendale Federal's pro-
posal, which contemplated the amortization of supervisory goodwill over
a forty-year period." Although the actual agreement between the Bank
Board and Glendale Federal was silent as to supervisory goodwill, the
amortization of supervisory goodwill was recognized in two forbearance
at 2442-43.
68. Id. at 2443.
69. See id. Describing the supervisory mergers, Harold Gilkey, Chairman of Sterling
Financial Corp. of Spokane, Washington, stated, "What the government asked us to
do was the heavy lifting." Bert Caldwell, Court Opens Door for Sterling; Decision Al-
lows Thrift to Seek $90 Million Damage Claim, SPOKESMAN REV., July 2, 1996, at A6,
available in 1996 WL 10787402. Sterling entered contracts with the government to
take over three failed thrifts with a combined negative net worth of $50 million and
$40 million in failing loans. See id.
70. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2443.
71. See id. Amortizing intangible goodwill is tantamount to depreciating tangible
assets. See id. at 2443-44 n.7; see also Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,
507 U.S. 546,"571 n.1 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). Supervisory goodwill has a lim-
ited useful life, prompting the thrift to "write down" the declining value of the asset
each year as an operating expense. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2443-44.
72. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
73. See id. at 2448.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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letters' and a memorandum' incorporated into the agreement through
the agreement's integration clause.'8
In 1983, the FSLIC sought bidders to acquire Windom Federal Savings
and Loan Association (Windom).' Windom was on the brink of insol-
vency at the time, and liquidation would cost the FSLIC approximately
$12 million.' A number of investors formed Winstar Corporation in or-
der to acquire Windom.81 Winstar submitted a proposal to the FSLIC
that called for the amortization of supervisory goodwill over a thirty-five
year period. 2 The Bank Board accepted Winstar's proposal in an agree-
ment similar to Glendale Federal's agreement.' Like Glendale Federal,
Winstar incorporated supervisory goodwill terms into its agreement
through a forbearance letter.' In addition, the Winstar agreement spe-
cifically provided for the accounting principles that would control the
agreement.m The agreement recognized the amortization of supervisory
goodwill and that this accounting principle would govern over any other
accounting principles, including those established by the Bank Board or
its successors.'
In 1987, Statesman submitted a proposal to the FSLIC to acquire an
insolvent subsidiary of First Federated Savings Bank.87 The FSLIC con-
ditioned approval of the acquisition on Statesman acquiring three addi-
76. See id. at 2449. One of the letters, drafted by Glendale Federals independent
accountant, described the goodwill to be recorded on Glendale Federal's books and
specified the corresponding amortization periods. See id. The other letter contained "a
stipulation that any goodwill arising from this transaction shall be determined and
amortized in accordance with [Bank Board] Memorandum R 31b." Id.
77. See id. Memorandum R 31b, issued by the Bank Board, provided for Glendale
Federal to amortize supervisory goodwill. See id.
78. See id. at 2448-49. The integration clause provided, in pertinent part, "This
Agreement . . . constitutes the entire agreement between the parties thereto and su-
persedes all prior agreements and understandings of the parties in connection here-
with, excepting only the Agreement of Merger and any resolutions or letters issued
contemporaneously herewith." Id.








87. See id. Like Winstar, Statesman was not a thrift. See id.
tional failing thrifts.' Statesman and the FSLIC ultimately entered an
agreement that employed the purchase method of accounting.89 Under
the agreement, Statesman contributed $21 million in cash and the FSLIC
contributed $60 million.9 The Statesman agreement differed from Glen-
dale Federal's and Winstar's agreements in that Statesman was permitted
to treat $26 million of the money from the FSLIC as a capital credit to-
ward Statesman's capital reserve requirements.9 1 Like Winstar's agree-
ment, the Statesman agreement provided for the use of the accounting
principles in effect on the date of the agreement.2 The agreement also
contained an integration clause which incorporated forbearance letters
and Bank Board resolutions that provided for the amortization of super-
visory goodwill over a period of twenty-five years. 3
In response to the poor results from the deregulation of the early and
mid-1980s, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 94 Under FIRREA, thrift regula-
tions were radically changed.99 The regulatory change with the greatest
impact on respondents was that supervisory goodwill no longer counted
toward the thrifts' capital reserve requirements.96 As a result of this new
regulation, respondents, along with many other similarly situated acquir-
ing thrifts, had inadequate capital reserves. Consequently, federal regu-
88. See id. at 2450-51.
89. See id. at 2451. Under the purchase method, the acquiring thrift accounts for
the acquired thrift's assets and liabilities based on their fair market value at the time
of the acquisition. See John W. Chierichella & Douglas E. Perry, Mergers and.Acqui-
sitions of Government Contractors: Special Considerations and Due Diligence Con-
cerns, 23 PUB. CONT. L.J. 471, 490 (1994). Any excess in the purchase price over the
fair market value is recorded as goodwill, which is amortized by the acquiring thrift
for as many as forty years. See Michael S. Helfer & Richard Sigel, Litigating For
and Against the FDIC and the RTC, in SUPERVISORY GOODWILL 656 (PLI Comm. Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 666, 1993). Under the FSLIC agreements,
this type of goodwill was called supervisory goodwill. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at
2443. This same purchase method of accounting was also recognized and used in the
Glendale and Winstar agreements. See id. at 2448, 2450.




94. See id. at 2446 (citing a General Accounting Office report and the conclusions
reached in Transohio Say. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d
598, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
95. See id.
96. See id. FIRREA also abolished the FSLIC, created a new thrift insurance fund
in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), replaced the Bank Board with
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and established the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion (RTC) to liquidate insolvent thrifts. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1437, 1441(G)
(1994) (explaining standards and collection for core capital).
97. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2446-47. Under FIRREA, thrifts were required "to
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lators seized and liquidated Winstar and Statesman.9' Respondent Glen-
dale Federal avoided liquidation by raising sufficient private capital to
stay in compliance with the capital reserve requirements.9
Respondents each filed suit for breach of contract against the federal
government in the Court of Federal Claims."° The Court of Federal
Claims granted summary judgment in favor of respondents on the breach
of contract issue,"' rejecting the government's defenses that: (1) the
government cannot be bound by a contract that limits its regulatory pow-
ers unless there is an "unmistakably clear" provision to that effect in the
contract,"° and (2) liability cannot attach to the government for sover-
eign acts under FIRREA.1" The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, en
maintain core capital in an amount not less than 3 percent of the savings
association's total assets." See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(2)(A) (1994).
98. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
99. See id. Glendale Federal raised $451 million in its epic recapitalization cam-
paign, the largest in United States' history. See Glenfed, Completing Parts of Over-
haul, To Begin Common-Stock Rights Offer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1993, at B4 [herein-
after Overhaul]. Under the recapitalization plan, which Glendale Federal's stockholders
narrowly approved, outside institutional investors purchased $201 million in preferred
stock and $169 million in outstanding shares of common stock. See California Thrift
Survives Another Round With U.S. Government, LIABIUTY WK., Sept. 27, 1993, at 3, 4
available in 1993 WL 2780678 [hereinafter Another Round]; see also Overhaul, supra.
In addition, Glendale Federal issued $81 million in new shares of common stock. See
Overhaul, supra. Existing stockholders purchased $10.1 million of the new issuance.
See Glendale Federal Bank Meets Worth Requirements, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 18,
1993, at B2. Institutional investors purchased the remainder. See id. When Glendale
Federal's recapitalization was complete, the stake of existing debenture holders, com-
mon stockholders, and preferred stockholders was slashed to a paltry twenty percent,
with new investors reaping the remaining eighty percent. See Overhaul, supra. The
common stockholders were left with barely two percent ownership in the thrift. See
Another Round, supra. According to Glendale Federal's CEO, Stephen Trafton, "the
significant dilution for the common shareholders was required in order to attract
enough new money to recapitalize the bank." Sam Zuckerman, Q&A: Glendale's
Trafton: The Possibility of Failure 'Never Crossed My Mind,' AM. BANKER, Aug. 26,
1993, at 5, available in 1993 WL 5813910. A failed recapitalization would cause the
liquidation of Glendale Federal, and the shareholders would, receive nothing. See An-
other Round, supra. In that respect, the true beneficiaries :of Glendale Federal's re-
capitalization were the American taxpayers, who ultimately bear the financial burden
of government liquidations.
100. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
101. See id.
102. See id.; see also Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112, 116 (1990).
103. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447; see also Winstar Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl.
Ct. 541, 550-53 (1992).
banc, affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, also rejecting the
government's unmistakability and sovereign acts arguments.' 4 The
United States Supreme Court granted the government's writ of certiora-
ri. 105
IV. THE OPINIONS
A. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court,"° which began
with a list of the four arguments advanced by the government to refute
respondents' breach of contract claims."7 The government's defenses
were: (1) the unmistakability doctrine,"° (2) that there must be an ex-
press delegation of authority for an agent to make contracts surrendering
sovereign authority,"° (3) that reserved powers cannot be contracted
away,"0 and (4) the sovereign acts doctrine."' After a close examina-
tion of the individual contracts at issue, Justice Souter concluded that
ordinary contract principles applied to the case."' Justice Souter pro-
ceeded to reject each of the government's defenses in turn.
With regard to the government's first defense, Justice Souter stated
that the scope of the unmistakability doctrine depends on the effect of a
contract's enforcement."3 If enforcement of the contract would prevent
104. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447; see also Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64
F.3d 1531 (C.A. Fed. 1995) (en banc).
105. See United States v. Winstar Corp. 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
106. Justices Stevens and Breyer joined in the judgment. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at
2440. Justice O'Connor joined in the judgment, except as to Parts IV-A and IV-B. See
id.
107. See id. at 2448.
108. Relying on Bowen, the government argued that the unmistakability doctrine
requires that any contractual limitation or surrender of government authority must be
expressed in unmistakable terms in the contract. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2453; see
also Brief for the Petitioner at 16, United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432
(1996) (No. 95-865), available in 1996 WL 99716. For a discussion of Bowen v. Public
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986), see supra notes
32-44 and accompanying text.
109. See Home Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 272-74 (1908).
110. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820-21 (1880) (holding that the govern-
ment may not contract away its police power).
111. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2448. Under the sovereign acts doctrine, "public and
general" governmental acts are deemed non-violative of contracts the government
enters into with private persons. See Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461
(1925).
112. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2453.
113. See id. at 2457. Justice Souter emphasized that the type of remedy sought is
not the defining element. See id. For example, in Bowen and Cherokee Nation the
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the government from exercising its sovereign powers, the unmistakability
doctrine applies.114 Because the Winstar contracts did not prevent the
government from exercising its authority to regulate the thrift industry,
the unmistakability doctrine did not apply."5 Respondents sought mon-
etary damages for losses suffered due to regulatory change, a risk specif-
ically assumed by the government in its contracts with respondents."'
Unlike prior cases applying the unmistakability doctrine,"7 respondents
did not seek specific performance or an exemption from the new regula-
tions. 8 Justice Souter also expressed concern that if the unmis-
takability doctrine indiscriminately permitted the government to escape
from its contractual obligations, public confidence in the government as
a "reliable contracting partner" would be lost."9
Justice Souter rendered the government's second and third defenses
moot based on the Court's conclusion that the Winstar contracts did not
implicate the surrender of sovereign powers, but merely shifted the risk
of future regulatory change to the government.' Nevertheless, upon
examination of the statute, Justice Souter concluded that the Bank Board
and the FSLIC had express authority to enter into the contracts with
respondents. 2'
Justice Souter rejected the government's fourth defense, stating that
the sovereign acts doctrine did not apply to this case, and even if it ap-
claimants sought monetary damages, but damage awards in those cases would have
had the effect of an exemption, and therefore, the unmistakability doctrine applied.
See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 2458. "Saying the government can be liable for breaching a contract
it made is not the same as saying the government waived its right to pass laws."
Helfer & Richardson, supra note 5, at 120.
116. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2458.
117. See, e.g., Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1991) (in-
volving a thrift which sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the OTS from ex-
cluding supervisory goodwill from its capital reserves requirements).
118. Justice Souter pointed out that "Glendale (the only respondent thrift still in
operation) would still be required to maintain adequate tangible capital reserves under
FIRREA." Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2458. Thus, the government's regulatory authority
was in no way implicated by the Winstar contracts.
119. See id. at 2459-60; see also The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. 51, 74 (1865) ("If
the knowledge that a contract made by a State with individuals is equally protected
from invasion as a contract made between natural persons, does not awaken watch-
fulness and care on the part of law-makers, it is difficult to perceive what would.").
120. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct at 2461-62.
121. See id. at 2462.
plied, the doctrine would not excuse liability under the contracts.'22
Justice Souter explained that the sovereign acts doctrine places the gov-
ernment as a contractor in the same position as a private contractor."
The rationale underlying the sovereign acts doctrine is that liability
should not attach to the government-as-contractor for the acts of the
government-as-sovereign.'" In the present case, the government's ca-
pacities as sovereign and as contractor were inextricably linked.'25 In
such cases, the greater the government's self-interest, the less likely the
sovereign acts doctrine will apply. 2 ' Because the congressional record
reflected the debate surrounding the issue of breach of contract with re-
gard to the passage of FIRREA, Justice Souter concluded that the enact-
ment of FIRREA indicated the specific intent to breach the contracts
with respondents and similarly situated thrifts.'27 For example, during
the House debate on FIRREA, Representative Rostenkowski stated that
"'the Federal government should be able to change requirements when
they have proven to be disastrous and contrary to the public interest.
The contracts between the savings and loan owners when they acquired
failing institutions in the early 1980's [sic] are not contracts written in
stone.""' In addition, Justice Souter noted that every court of appeals
122. See id. at 2463.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 2463-64.
125. See id. at 2464.
126. See id. at 2465-66.
127. See id. at 2467. Although not mentioned in the opinion, there were approxi-
mately twenty proposed amendments to FIRREA regarding supervisory goodwill. See
Robert M. Garsson, Amendments Threaten Delay of Bailout Vote; House Panel
Weighs 100 Changes to S&L Bill, Am. BANKER, June 6, 1989, at 1, available in 1989
WL 7316313. Representative Quillen's amendment was designed to protect supervisory
goodwill altogether, essentially grandfathering in all thrifts which had supervisory
merger agreements with the government. See 135 CONG. REC. H2700 (daily ed. June
15, 1989). An amendment proposed by Representative Hyde sought to provide for an
intense administrative procedure before a thrift could be forced to write off its su-
pervisory goodwill, thus guaranteeing thrifts due process. See 135 CONG. REc. H2704
(daily ed. June 15, 1989). The House limited debate to the Hyde amendment. See id.
Representative Quillen withdrew his amendment because he felt debate on both
amendments was unfair to the House due to the House's self-imposed time con-
straints for decision on the bill. See 135 CONG. REC. H2602-01, H2701, (daily ed. June
15, 1989). The Hyde Amendment was rejected by a 94-326 vote. See 135 CONG. REC.
H2717 (daily ed. June 15, 1989). Prophetically, during debate on the Hyde Amend-
ment, Representative Porter warned that if the Hyde Amendment was not passed,
"those thrifts that were encouraged to merge . . . will take the Government to court
to force us to recognize our commitments." See 135 CONG. REC. H2709 (daily ed.
June 15, 1989).
128. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2468 (quoting 135 CONG. REC. H2717 (daily ed. June 15,
1989)).
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that heard the issue concluded that Congress intended to breach its su-
pervisory goodwill contracts.129
Justice Souter also stated that the sovereign acts defense is not avail-
able "where a substantial part of the impact of the government's action
rendering performance impossible falls on its own contractual obliga-
tions."3 ° Justice Souter concluded that even though Congress intended
to protect the public by passing FIRREA, "the extent to which this re-
form relieved the government of its own contractual obligations pre-
cludes a finding that the statute is a 'public and general' act for purposes
of the sovereign acts defense." 3' Finally, Justice Souter stated that even
if the sovereign acts doctrine applied, the defense failed because the
government could not prove that the passage of future regulation render-
ing performance of the Winstar contracts impossible was not contem-
plated by the parties.'32 Rather, the possibility of regulatory change was
not only foreseen and contemplated by the parties, but the government
impliedly assumed the risk of such regulatory change." Concluding the
plurality opinion, Justice Souter stated that "[ilt would, indeed, have
been madness for respondents to have engaged in these transactions
with no more protection than the Government's reading would have
given them, for the very existence of their institutions would then have
129. See id. at 2467 n.47. See, e.g., Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Carteret Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 963 F.2d 567, 581-82 (3rd Cir. 1992); Security Sav. & Loan v. Director,
Office of Thrift Supervision, 960 F.2d 1318, 1322 (5th Cir. 1992); Far W. Fed. Bank v.
Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 951 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1991); Guaranty
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994, 1006 (11th Cir. 1991); Franklin Fed. Sav. Bank
v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 927 F.2d 1332, 1341 (6th Cir. 1991).
130. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2466.
131. See id. at 2469.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 2469-70. The government may contractually assume the risk of future
regulatory change. See Amino Bros. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 485, 491 (Ct. C1.
1967) ("The Government cannot make a binding contract that it will not exercise a
sovereign power, but it can agree in a contract that if it does so, it will pay the
other contracting party the amount by which its costs are increased by the
Government's sovereign act." (citations omitted)).
been in jeopardy from the moment their agreements were signed."''
Consequently, the Court affirmed the federal circuit's decision.'35
B. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion in which he gave further
treatment to the unmistakability doctrine issue. '36 Justice Breyer stated
that the unmistakability doctrine "was not intended to displace the rules
of contract interpretation applicable to the government as well as private
contractors in numerous ordinary cases, and in certain unusual cas-
es."3' In Justice Breyer's view, the Winstar case was one of the "un-
usual cases" in which the government was not shielded from liability
under the unmistakability doctrine.'" Breyer pointed to "common sense
and precedent" to support his position that unmistakable contract lan-
guage is not always necessary for private parties to prove that the gov-
ernment agreed to bear the risk of damages caused by newly enacted
legislation.'39 For instance, the Court held the government liable in
Lynch and Perry without unmistakable contract language.'4° From a
practical standpoint, strict enforcement of an unmistakability require-
ment could make private parties wary of doing business with the govern-
ment.' Justice Breyer dismissed the government's argument that the
unmistakability doctrine strictly applies to prevent the deterrence of
necessary legislation.'42 In Justice Breyer's view, it is inappropriate to
use a stricter approach to contract interpretation merely because more
134. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2472; see Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 403, 413 (1926)
(stating that it was unreasonable to construe a deed and ordinance as leaving the
city council "the absolute right completely to nullify the chief consideration" for ac-
quiring the subject property); Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry., 184 U.S. 368, 384
(1902) (stating that it would not be credible for an individual to agree that a critical
contract provision could be changed at the city government's sole discretion); Murray
v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1877) (stating with regard to government contracts
that "[a] promise to pay, with a reserved right to deny or change the effect of the
promise, is an absurdity"); The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. 51, 78 (1865) (reflecting
that "it would be madness for adventurers to build toll-bridges in a new country,
where travel was limited and settlers few, if the right was retained to authorize other
adventurers to build other bridges, so near as to divide even that limited travel").
135. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2472.
136. See id. at 2472-76 (Breyer, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 2472 (Breyer, J., concurring).
138. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
139. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
140. See id. at 2473 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also supra notes 13-22 and accom-
panying text (discussing Lynch); supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text (discussing
Perry).
141. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2473 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
142. See id. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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money is involved, and hence, a greater potential for future legislation to
be deterred." However, this is not to suggest the abandonment of the
unmistakability doctrine altogether.'44 The cases applying the
unmistakability doctrine involved "unique features of sovereignty" which
justified relieving the government of its contractual obligations on the
basis of public policy.'45
C. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, wrote an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment.4 ' Although Justice Scalia agreed with
the plurality in rejecting each of the government's defenses, he gave dif-
ferent reasons for his rejection.'47
In Justice Scalia's view, the unmistakability doctrine applied to the
contracts in Winstar.' However, respondents overcame the "reverse-
presumption that the government remains free to make its own perfor-
mance impossible through its manner of regulation" because the parties
expressly agreed that the respondents would receive favorable regulatory
treatment.' If the government was not bound to give respondents fa-
vorable regulatory treatment, the government's promise would be illuso-
ry.150
Justice Scalia rejected the governments other arguments in short or-
der. '5 Justice Scalia rejected the "reserved powers" defense on the
ground that respondents sought damages, and were not attempting to
prevent the government from exercising its sovereign power.'52 Justice
Scalia rejected the "express delegation" defense on the ground that the
applicable statutes granted the agents of the Bank Board and FSLIC the
authority to contract on behalf of the government." Finally, Justice
Scalia rejected the "sovereign acts" defense, stating that the "sovereign
143. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
144. See id. at 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring).
145. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
146. See id. at 2476-79 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. See id. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring).
148. See id. at 2477 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 41
151. See id. at 2478 (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
acts" defense should be avoided whenever the "unmistakability doctrine"
defense fails, in other words, whenever the government assumes the risk
of regulatory change.
D. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Ginsburg joined as to Parts I, III, and IV." Rehnquist's dissent criti-
cized the Winstar plurality for severely limiting the breadth of both the
unmistakability doctrine and the sovereign acts doctrine." Rehnquist
agreed with the government's argument that the surrender of sovereign
authority must be expressed in unmistakable terms in the contract."7
Rehnquist argued that the plurality's refusal to apply the unmistakability
doctrine to the present case was inconsistent with precedent."8
Rehnquist traced the relevant case law from United States v. Cherokee
Nation,"9 back through Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social
Security Entrapment6. and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,'
which relied on language from St. Louis v. United Railways Co." that
stated the government retains the right to tax "unless this right has been
specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no other reasonable
interpretation.""
Similar to United Railways, Merrion involved the sovereign right to
tax, but it was the sovereignty of an Indian tribe rather than the sover-
eignty of the government which was at issue.TM Bowen involved an
amendment to the Social Security Act which affected states' rights to
withdraw their employees from the Social Security System." Quoting
Merrion, the Bowen Court applied the unmistakability doctrine to the
contracts, stating that "contractual arrangements, including those to
which a sovereign itself is a party, 'remain subject to subsequent
legislation' by the sovereign. " "
154. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. See id. at 2479-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 2479 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
157. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 2480 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
159. 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
160. 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
161. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
162. 210 U.S. 266 (1908).
163. Id. at 280; see also Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2479 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
164. See Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982); see also Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2479
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
165. See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 43-51 (1986); see also Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2479
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
166. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2479 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Bowen, 477
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In Cherokee Nation, the Court applied the unmistakability doctrine to a
treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe.6 7 The Court held
that the treaty did not exempt the tribe from a navigational servitude be-
cause no such exemption appeared in the treaty in unmistakable
terms."
In sum, Rehnquist stated that until Winstar, existing case law pointed
to "the well-understood proposition" that "a waiver of sovereign authority
will not be implied, but instead must be surrendered in unmistakable
terms."'69 Rehnquist criticized the plurality for inventing a new distinc-
tion under which the unmistakability doctrine applies to cases in which a
party seeks an injunction or exemption from a new law, 70 but not to
cases in which a party seeks only damages. 7 ' According to Rehnquist,
the distinction raises a practical problem because it is impossible to
determine whether damages will implicate the unmistakability doctrine
until the actual damages in each case are assessed,72 and only then can
a court determine whether the damages would have the effect of an
injunction or an exemption. 7 ' Rehnquist concluded that "we do not
know in this very case whether the award of damages would amount to
an injunction [and] if it did, under the plurality's theory, the
unmistakability doctrine would apply, and that application may preclude
respondents' claim. "17
Chief Justice Rehnquist further argued that the sovereign acts doctrine
applied in the present case, and that the plurality's failure to apply it
rendered the doctrine a mere "shell."75 According to Rehnquist, the plu-
U.S. at 52 (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147)).
167. See Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 701, 705-07 (1989); see also Winstar, 116 S.
Ct. at 2479-80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
168. See Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. at 707; see also Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2480
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
169. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2840 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
170. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Damages having the effect of an injunction
or exemption from the new law are also included under this category. See id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
171. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the
distinction drawn by the plurality was "never before seen in our caselaw." See id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
172. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
173. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
175. See id. at 2482 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The plurality responded to
Rehnquist's doomsday prophecy in a footnote stating that "the sun is not, in fact,
rality curtailed the sovereign acts doctrine by making the public and
general nature of an act contingent upon the legislative intent behind the
act.'76 Rehnquist criticized the plurality's excessive quoting from the leg-
islative record to demonstrate possible "governmental self-interest" or a
motive of "self-relief' underlying the enactment of FIRREA because, in so
doing, the plurality melded the government's dual roles as contractor and
sovereign.177 Rehnquist ignored the comments of legislators from the
legislative record, and instead, looked at the text of FIRREA itself to
determine whether FIRREA was sufficiently public and general to merit
protection under the sovereign acts doctrine.78 Because of the sweep-
ing language describing FIRREA as "[a]n [a]ct [t]o reform, recapitalize,
and consolidate the Federal deposit insurance system, to enhance the
regulatory and enforcement powers of Federal financial institutions regu-
latory agencies,"'79 and the drastic reforms FIRREA made in the regula-
tion of the thrift industry, Rehnquist likened FIRREA to a public and gen-
eral act worthy of protection under the sovereign acts doctrine."8
Because he believed the unmistakability doctrine and the sovereign
acts doctrine had not been overcome, Chief Justice Rehnquist recom-
mended reversal of the remand of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration based upon his formulation of
the unmistakability doctrine and sovereign acts doctrine. 8 '
likely to set on the sovereign acts doctrine . . . . [W]e may expect that other sover-
eign activity will continue to occasion the sovereign acts defense in cases of inciden-
tal effect." Id. at 2466 n.45.
176. See id. at 2482 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 2483 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Rehnquist pointed out that
Horowitz v. United States warned against confusing the government's role as a con-
tractor with its role as a sovereign. See id. at 2482-83 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
see also Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925) (stating that "the United
States when sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction of the
performance of the particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a
sovereign").
178. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2483 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
179. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in part at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994)).
180. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2483 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 2485 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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V. IMPACT
A. Impact on the Thrift Industry
Perhaps the most immediate, short-term impact of Winstar was reflect-
ed in the steady rise of S&Ls' stock prices after the July 1, 1996 Winstar
decision.'82 Another immediate impact will be the damages that the
Winstar respondents are likely to be awarded. The Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the Court of Federal Claims to determine the correct
measure and amount of each respondent's damages."8 Pursuant to spe-
cial case-management procedures in the damages phase of the case,
more than 120 similarly situated thrifts with Winstar-related litigation
pending against the government joined respondents.8 The special case-
management procedures allow for the efficient and expedient resolution
of certain issues common to many or all of the thrifts.'85
On February 24, 1997, respondent Glendale Federal was the first to
present evidence of its estimated $1.86 million in damages before Chief
Judge Loren A. Smith." Glendale Federal's trial was expected to last
only a few weeks, however, the trial proceeded longer because Glendale
182. See, e.g., Jaret Seiberg, Top Court: U.S. Must Pay for Accounting-Policy Shift;
Over 100 Thrifts May Be Awarded Damages, AM. BANKER, July 2, 1996, at 1, avail-
able in 1996 WL 5565638 (stating that Glendale Federal's stock increased $1.50 to
$19.625 after the Winstar decision was announced).
183. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2472.
184. See Plaintiffs in Winstar-Related Cases v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 174, 177
(1997).
185. See id. In Winstar-Related Cases, the Court of, Federal Claims determined
when the plaintiffs' breach of contract claims accrued for purposes of calculating the
relevant statute of limitations. See id. The government filed motions to dismiss
against twenty-six thrifts based on the running of the six-year statute of limitations.
See id. at 177. The court rejected the government's argument that the statute of limi-
tations began running upon the enactment of FIRREA and determined that the statute
was triggered only after the OTS's implementation of the regulations against the
thrifts. See id. at 182-84. The deadline for filing was December 8, 1995. See id. at
182. The court, therefore, denied the government's motions to dismiss because the
twenty-four plaintiffs had brought suit less than six years after the OTS regulations
took effect. See id. at 182-83. However, the government's motions to dismiss were
granted as to Leonard Shane and Ariadne Financial Services, which had filed on Feb-
ruary 22, 1996 and April 16, 1996, respectively. See id. at 184-91 & n.4.
186. See Jaret Seiberg, Capital Briefs: Glendale Federal Goes to Court in Goodwill
Case, Am. BANKER, Feb. 25, 1997, at 2, available in 1997 WL 4747881; see also Jaret
Seiberg, Glenfed Seeking up to $1.86B From U.S. in Goodwill Suit, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 13, 1996, at 2, available in 1996 WL 14013540.
Federal presented evidence in meticulous detail.187 Trial critics dubbed
the case "the banking industry's equivalent of the O.J. Simpson trial,"
complete with parties presenting, defending, and objecting to a mountain
of evidence and a judge who never seemed to have control over the
lawyers, the case, or the courtroom."8 As a result, Glendale Federal's
trial was not expected to conclude until October 1997, delaying
Statesman's trial and ten other thrifts' trials by at least six months.8 9
Operating S&Ls that benefit from Winstar precedent are expected to
use the funds awarded as damages for future mergers and acquisi-
tions.' 9 The pending resolution of the Winstar-related cases delayed
many mergers and acquisitions in the S&L industry.' Thrifts on both
sides of takeover scenarios are proceeding with caution due to difficul-
ties in calculating takeover prices because it is impossible to predict the
amount of potential damages, if any.' 92 Determining a takeover price is
further complicated because the Winstar decision inflated target thrifts'
stock prices.93
After its recapitalization campaign to stay afloat, respondent Glendale
Federal is recovering from its FIRREA-triggered setback. Glendale Feder-
al reported profits of $23.2 million for the fiscal second quarter ending
December 31, 1996, a 61% increase over the previous year."u In 1995,
before the Winstar decision, Glendale Federal posted a loss of $10.7
million in the second quarter.
1 95
Glendale Federal is working hard to remain competitive in the banking
industry.'96 Since the Winstar decision, Glendale Federal has launched
187. Jaret Seiberg, Docket: Goodwill Case is Trial of Everybody's Patience, AM.
BANKER, June 11, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 4751205.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Shutdown, supra note 11, at BI (stating that most S&Ls have the
flexibility to use the proceeds of any damage awards toward mergers and acquisitions
because the thrift industry is recovering and becoming more financially stable).
191. See Snigdha Prakash, Goodwill Suits Seen Hampering Calif. Thrift Buyouts,
AM. BANKER, Feb. 10, 1997, at 13, available in 1997 WL 4747458.
192. See id.
193. See id.; Bill Richards, Glendale Federal and Golden West Post Strong Profits,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2406938.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. For instance, Glendale Federal plans to open 42 new branches in California
before 1999 in order to capitalize on branch closings throughout California following
the onslaught of recent thrift and bank mergers. See 16 New Glendale Branches by
Mid-July, AM. BANKER, Feb. 25, 1997, at 6, available in 1997 WL 4747874. Also, Glen-
dale Federal announced it would be the first California bank to offer medical savings
accounts which "enable customers to set aside funds earmarked for health expenses."
See GlenFed to Offer Medical Savings Accounts, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at D2.
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aggressive advertisements targeting its rivals' customers' 7 and has be-
come active in the mergers and acquisitions arena.9 " Despite its own
aggressive acquisition maneuvers, Glendale Federal is considered a prime
target for acquisition in the recent wave of thrift and bank mergers in
Southern California. However, any merger involving Glendale Federal
will have to await the resolution of the damages phase of the Winstar
case.
200
The Winstar decision is likely to have a tremendous res judicata ef-
fect.2"' Over one hundred similarly situated thrifts will be lining up to
sue the government for breach of contract, wielding the newly sharpened
197. Foremost among Glendale Federal's targets are Wells Fargo Bank and
BankAmerica Corp. See Christopher Rhoads, Wells Says It's Offsetting Flight of 1st
Interstate Customers, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 1996, at 5, available in 1996 WL 5568883;
see also Glendale Federal Bank Purchase Pact is Reached With TransWorld Bancorp,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1996, at B4 [hereinafter Purchase Pact]. Glendale Federal's strate-
gy is paying off with a twofold increase in its checking deposits from 1996 to 1997.
See Jim Carlton, Wells Fargo Shares Tumble on News It Will Post Lower-Than-Ex-
pected Net, WALL. ST. J., July 10, 1997, at A3. Glendale Federal attributes a large
number of its new accounts to "former First Interstate customers unhappy at seeing
their neighborhood branches closed" after Wells Fargo's acquisition of First Interstate.
See id.
198. In November 1996, Glendale Federal acquired TransWorld Bancorp for nearly
$63 million in cash. See Purchase Pact, supra note 197, at B4; see also Summary of
U.S. Public Merger Activity Greater Than $25M-Finance, Insurance, Real Estate:
TransWorld Banc, MERGERS & RESTRUCTURING, Nov. 22, 1996, at 7, 7, available in
1996 WL 12775569. In July 1997, Glendale Federal formed a holding company named
Golden State Bancorp Inc. to facilitate stock buybacks and future acquisitions. See
GlenFed Plans to Form Thrift Holding Company, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1997, at D2;
Glendale Federal Bank Shareholders Approve Formation of Holding Company (July
23, 1997) <http://biz.yahoo.com/pmews/97/07/23/gln..gsb-y-l.html> (cite no longer in
service). By mid-August 1997, Golden State Bancorp agreed to acquire CenFed Bank
in a $210 million stock swap. See Don Lee, Golden State to Buy CenFed for $210
Million, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1997, at D2.
199. See Debora Vrana, State's Remaining Big Thrifts Vulnerable to Takeover, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at D5; see also Lee, supra note 198, at D2.
200. See Vrana, supra note 199, at D5. In the meantime, Glendale Federal is expect-
ed to seize the opportunity to lure customers away from banks that are in the midst
of a post-merger transition. See id.; see also supra note 197 and accompanying text
(discussing Glendale Federal's strategy of targeting dissatisfied customers at rival
banks, such as Wells Fargo Bank and BankAmerica).
201. Under the doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, a final
judgment on the merits bars subsequent litigation between the parties or persons in
privity with the parties from re-litigating the same cause of action. See Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
sword of nonmutual collateral estoppel. 0 2 Provided such thrifts' con-
tracts are at all similar to those of the Winstar respondents, the govern-
ment stands to lose an estimated $15 billion in future litigation.2" Ulti-
mately, taxpayers will bear the burden of paying any and all judgments
against the government. Among the potential beneficiaries of Winstar's
res judicata effect are a number of thrifts and banking institutions that
filed amicus briefs on behalf of the Winstar respondents.2" Many of the
amicus thrifts or banking institutions entered merger agreements similar
202. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, precludes relitigation in a
subsequent case of an issue previously litigated, decided, and necessary to the judg-
ment in a prior case. See id.; see also Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-
53 (1876). Res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent relitigation of the same issues
and promote judicial efficiency. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326. Unlike res judicata,
collateral estoppel does not require mutuality between the parties. See Blonder-Tongue
Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971). Collateral estoppel
can be invoked as a defensive measure, i.e. a "shield," or as an offensive measure,
i.e. a "sword." See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329. Thus, in subsequent cases brought by
Winstar-related thrifts, the government is precluded from relitigating any of the four
defenses the Court rejected in Winstar.
203. See Shutdown, supra note 11, at B1. Of course, Winstar alone does not guar-
antee that similarly situated thrifts will also prevail in the Court of Federal Claims.
See id. Each thrift's contract will have to be reviewed independently. See id. Robert
0. Smedley, Jr., President of Lochaven Federal Savings and Loan Association in Or-
lando and a "former manager with the Resolution Trust Corp., questioned the
precedential value of the Winstar decision, stating "[each thrift] cut individual deals
with the government." See id. "Every contractual agreement was on a case-by-case
basis, so this [ruling] may not mean that the next guy will win." See id.
204. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Western Federal Savings and Loan Association
and Westfed Holdings, Inc. in Support of Respondents, United States v. Winstar Corp.,
116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996), available in 1996 WL 144106 (thrift that entered merger
agreement with the federal government pre-FIRREA, became insolvent post-FIRREA,
and was subsequently seized); Brief Arnici Curiae of AmBase Corporation and
Carteret Bancorp, Inc. in Support of Respondents, United States v. Winstar Corp., 116
S. Ct. 2432 (1996), available in 1996 WL 139764 (banking institutions that suffered
financial losses due to FIRREA's effect on government contracts); Brief of Franklin
Financial Group, Inc.; Franklin Federal Savings Bank; First American Corporation; C.
Robert Suess, Leo C. Sherry, Jr., Richard A. Green, Irving Roberts and Foster,
Pauisell & Baker, Inc.; Landmark Land Company, Inc.; Charter One Bank, F.S.B.;
Commercial Federal Corporation and Commercial Federal Bank, F.S.B.; Citizens Feder-
al Bank, F.S.B.; and Perpetual Financial Corporation as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996), available in 1996
WL 143635 (ten thrifts and banking institutions that acquired ailing thrifts under gov-
ernment contracts during the S&L bailout); Brief of Amici Curiae Trinity Ventures,
Ltd. and Castle Harlan, Inc. in Support of Respondents, United States v. Winstar
Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996), available in 1996 WL 143638 (thrifts that recapitalized
two insolvent thrifts in exchange for the government's promise to count the insolvent
thrifts' supervisory goodwill toward the acquiring thrift's capital requirements "notwith-
standing any subsequent changes" in how capital requirements are defined).
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to those of the Winstar respondents and have litigation pending against
the federal government.0 5 Of these, the lawsuit filed by Trinity Ven-
tures, Ltd. and Castle Harlan, Inc. is the only other Winstar-related case
presently pending before a federal appellate court.2" Another group of
amici consisted of thrifts entering into contracts with the government to
acquire other insolvent thrifts in exchange for government forbearance
notes which provided that the acquiring thrifts were not required to post
the required capital to support FSLIC insurance. 7 These amici's con-
tracts did not involve any supervisory goodwill."
Another group of amici included four thrifts with contracts similar to
that of respondent Statesman which involved regulatory capital credits
rather than supervisory goodwill.2" Including amici thrifts, there are ap-
proximately 122 similarly situated thrifts with breach of contract lawsuits
205. See infra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing pending litigation in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims).
206. See Brief of Amici Curiae Trinity Ventures, Ltd. and Castle Harlan, Inc., supra
note 204. In Trinity Ventures, Far West Bank entered into a series of agreements
with the Bank Board in 1987 including a forbearance letter exempting Far West Bank
from the then-applicable capital reserve requirements for ten years. See Far W. Fed.
Bank, S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision-Director, 119 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir.
1997). Before FIRREA was enacted, bank loans to individual borrowers could not ex-
ceed a certain percentage of the bank's capital reserves. See id. With intangible as-
sets included in its capital reserves, Far West Bank was able to loan more money to
individual borrowers. See id. After the passage of FIRREA, however, Far West Bank
lost the benefit of its forbearance agreements with the government. See id. The dis-
trict court awarded $26.6 million to Far West Bank based on a frustration of purpose
theory. See Far W. Fed. Bank, S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, Director, 787 F.
Supp. 952, 960-62 (D. Or. 1992), affd on other grounds, 119 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir.
1997). The court of appeals rejected the district court's frustration of purpose ratio-
nale, but relying on the Winstar decision, affirmed the district court's ruling on the
grounds that the government breached its forbearance agreement with Far West
Bank. See Far W. Fed. Bank, 119 F.3d at 1363-64, 1366.
207. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Keystone Holdings, Inc., and American
Savings Bank, F.A. in Support of Respondents, United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S.
Ct. 2432 (1996) (No. 95-865), available in 1996 WL 144110.
208. See id.
209. See generally Brief of Coast Federal Bank, FSB, Union Federal Savings Bank
of Indianapolis, Union Holding Company, Inc., Meadows Resources, Inc. and Republic
Holding Company, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, United States v.
Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996) (No. 95-865), available in 1996 WL 139763 (pro-
posing that the government is not immune from damages caused when promises are
breached regarding regulatory capital credits).
pending against the government in the United States Court of Federal
Claims.21°
B. Impact Beyond the Thrift Industry
Despite the magnitude of the Winstar decision, its effect on most ev-
eryday, run-of-the-mill government supply contracts will be minimal.
Government contracts usually contain boilerplate provisions anticipating
and protecting against nearly every conceivable situation.2 1 For in-
stance, most government contracts contain "terminate for convenience"
clauses as standard provisions." ' Thus, businesses such as those repre-
sented in the United States Chamber of Commerce's amicus brief.1 3 will
derive little benefit from the Winstar decision. Similarly, the academic
institutions, scientists, environmental and health care organizations, and
social services represented by amici curiae. 4 are unlikely to benefit
substantially from the decision because these organizations' contracts are
usually standardized and contain provisions permitting the government to
avoid its contract without effecting a breach.
210. See Richard C. Reuben, S&L Seek U.S. 'Deposits': Thrifts and Investors Allege
in Pending Lawsuits That Broken Federal Promises Entitle Them to Damages, 83
A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (January 1997). Approximately one half of the thrifts with litigation
pending are no longer in operation. See Patricia Lamiell, High Court Sides With
Thris in Lawsuit; Says Rule Change Damaged Industry, ARIz. REPuBuc, July 2,
1996, at El, available in 1996 WL 7718581.
211. See Marianne Lavelle, Federal Contractors Hail High Court's S&L Ruling,
NAT'L L.J., July 15, 1996, at BI.
212. See id. Had the parties incorporated such clauses in the Winstar contracts, the
Winstar Court would probably have reached a different result. However, it is unlikely
that any of the acquiring thrifts would have agreed to merger contracts with termi-
nate for convenience clauses.
213. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America in Support of Respondents, United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S.
Ct. 2432 (1996) (No. 95-865), available in 1996 WL 144124 (challenging the
government's ability to abrogate a valid contract following a unilateral act of Con-
gress).
214. See generally Brief of the American Association of State Colleges and Universi-
ties, American Council on Education, the California Association of Health Facilities,
Envirotest Systems Corp., the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biol-
ogy, and the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct.
2432 (1996) (No. 95-865), available in 1996 WL 144140 (noting how important it is
for these organization to rely upon government contracts); Brief of Amici Curiae
Watts Health Foundation, Inc. and Beyond Shelter, Inc. in Support of Respondents,
United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996), available in 1996 WL 139765
(focusing on contracts between non-profit organizations and the government).
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Winstar's broadest and most far-reaching impact will arguably be on
ad-hoc contracts drafted for special circumstances.215 The government
usually enters such ad-hoc contracts with private parties using favorable
contract terms as incentives to resolve a predicament the government
cannot resolve itself.216 The Winstar contracts, for example, were
thrown together in a flurry, indicating the government's desperation to
find a cure for its S&L headache. The government assumed the risk of
contract-breaching legislative changes in exchange for the thrifts' agree-
ment to bail out insolvent thrifts that the FSLIC, and later the FDIC,
could not afford to bail out themselves.
In Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States,"' the gov-
ernment entered into another ad-hoc agreement with a private contrac-
tor. In Hughes, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) entered a contract with Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. to
launch ten of Hughes's satellites from its space shuttles.218 At the time,
NASA promoted commercial use of its space shuttles and encouraged
private industries to use the shuttles as a means to finance its space pro-
gram.2"9 Although the contract granted termination rights to both par-
ties, NASA could terminate only "upon a determination in writing that
NASA is required to Terminate such services for Reasons Beyond NASA's
Control."" 9 The contract also provided a schedule for launch services
which was expressly subject to "the United States policy governing
launch assistance approved by the President of the United States on Au-
gust 6, 1982."" After the Challenger disaster in 1986 and before NASA
launched any of Hughes's satellites, President Reagan issued an order
announcing that the space shuttle would no longer launch commercial
satellites."
The Hughes court, taking an approach similar to the Court in Winstar,
found that NASA assumed the risk of future changes affecting the space
program.2" The court gave special attention to the provision in the con-
215. See Lavelle, supra note 211, at B1.
216. See id.
217. 998 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
218. See id. at 955.
219. See id.
220. Id. (citing Art. VII, 1.a(iv) of the contract). Hughes, on the other hand, could
terminate the contract at any time so long as it reimbursed NASA for its costs. See
id.
221. Id. at 957.
222. See id. at 956.
223. See id. at 959; see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2469-
tract that stated that the parties entered into the contract subject to the
space program policies as of August 6, 1982.22 It made no difference to
the court that the changes resulted from the government's sovereign
acts.225 As in Winstar, the court emphasized that the government was
not enjoined or otherwise prevented from regulating its space program,
but was liable for damages its new regulations caused.22
Additionally, Winstar may create government liability for breach of
contract in pending litigation in the timber and pulp industry. The trigger
for the government's possible breach with respect to the timber and pulp
industry is the Tongass Timber Reform Act of 1990 (Tongass Act).2 As
a result of the Tongass Act, Alaska Pulp Corp. (APC) filed a $1.6 billion
suit against the government based on Winstar, alleging that the Tongass
Act unilaterally changed the terms of APC's logging contracts with the
Forest Service, causing APC to go out of business.228 Ketchikan Pulp
Corp. (KPC) also filed suit for breach of its logging contracts with the
government.229 KPC seeks damages for annual losses allegedly caused
by the passage of the Tongass Act." ° As in Winstar, the government
asserts that APC and KPC are not entitled to damages because the
Tongass Act was an exercise of the government's sovereign powers to
protect the public welfare.23
In attacking the government's sovereign act defense, the two compa-
nies are likely to emphasize the similarities between the thrift and timber
industries in an effort to exploit the favorable outcome in Winstar. 2
For example, both the timber industry and the thrift industry are highly
regulated by the government.2" The government created the thrift in-
dustry to facilitate the purchase of affordable housing.2" Similarly, the
70 (1996); supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (discussing the government's
assumption of the risk of regulatory change in the Winstar contracts).
224. See Hughes, 998 F.2d at 959.
225. See id.
226. See id.; see also Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2458.
227. See Margaret Kriz, Forest Fight, NAT'L J., Sept. 21, 1996, at 1998, 2000, avail-
able in 1996 WL 10107652.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id. KPC expects to lose $40 million in 1996. See id.
231. See H.R. REP. No. 101-84, at 24 (1989).
232. See Tongass National Forest Management: Hearing on H.R. 3659 Before a
Joint Hearing of the House Comm. on Agriculture and Comm. of Resources, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (testimony of Scott W. Horngren, attorney for the Northwest
Forest Resource Council). The Northwest Forest Resource Council is "a coalition of
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government created the federal timber sale program to meet the de-
mands of residential housing."O Also, as in Winstar, the plaintiffs do
not seek injunctive relief restricting the government's regulatory and
legislative authority, but monetary damages for the breach of contract
resulting from the government's legislative changes."
A few days after the Winstar decision, Senator Murkowski introduced
a bill to extend KPC's contract with the government for an additional
fifteen years."7 In his opening statement, Senator Murkowski used the
Winstar decision as leverage, stating that the Winstar decision under-
mined Congress's and the Clinton Administration's assumptions that the
sovereign acts doctrine would protect the government from liability to
KPC and APC for unilaterally modifying the pulp contracts. 8
The types of contracts that Winstar may affect are potentially limit-
less. Winstar has already been invoked with regard to the following:
Indian tribe sovereign rights, 9 the effect of a proposed nuclear waste
clean-up amendment on existing government contracts with private nu-
clear power companies," ° and the effect of regulatory changes on pro-
duction flexibility contracts with farmers.24 There is also potential gov-
ernment liability to defense and aerospace contractors resulting from
defense downsizing by the Clinton administration.2" Although Winstar
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See S. 1877, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). Representative Young from Alaska
introduced an identical bill in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 3659, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
238. See Hearing on S. 1877, The Environmental Improvement Timber Contract
Extension Act of 1996, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (opening statement of Senator
Murkowski).
239. The effect of Winstar on tribal sovereign immunity has been debated in the
United States Senate. See Tribal Rights in Private Property Cases: Hearing Before
the Senate Indian Affairs Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) (testimony of Lana E.
Marcussen).
240. Senator Johnston cited Winstar during a debate over an Amendment to the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1996 that would affect contracts with commercial nucle-
ar power companies. See 142 CONG. REC. S9216-02 (daily ed. July 31, 1996).
241. An argument was made in a debate in the House of Representatives that, pur-
suant to the holding of Winstar, the government assumed the risk of regulatory
change in its contracts with farmers. See 142 CONG. REC. E1902-02 (daily ed. Oct. 2,
1996) (extension of remarks of Rep. Roberts).
242. See Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., U.S. Industry in Vigorous Fight Against Proposed
Policy Reversal, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 22, 1996, at 30, 30-31, available in
1996 WL 10848231; see also Brief for Aerospace Industries Association of America,
may not be the panacea for every legally contracted disease,"3 the di-
versity of the areas in which Winstar is being cited, debated, and argued
indicates that its holding will leave behind a legacy limited only by the
creativity of plaintiffs' lawyers.
MARK T. CRAMER
Inc., Electronic Industries Association, National Security Industrial Association, and
Shipbuilders Council of America as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, United
States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996), available in 1996 WL 144129. Amici
have entered thousands of contracts with the government, primarily related to mili-
tary and defense. See id. These contracts in the aggregate are worth billions of dol-
lars. See id.
243. See, e.g., Lurline Gardens Ltd. Hous. Partnership v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl.
415, available in 1997 WL 94675 at *6 n.10 (refusing to apply Winstar to contracts
between a housing developer and the Federal Housing Administration because the
contracts did not incorporate regulations in effect at the time the contracts were
formed).
